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Abstract
We develop a model where families consist of one parent and one child, with children differing
in income and all agents having the same probability of becoming dependent when old. Young
and old individuals vote over the size of a social long term care transfer program, which children
complement with help in time or money to their dependent parent. Dependent parents have an
intrinsic preference for help in time by family members.
We first show that low (resp., high) income children provide help in time (resp. in money),
whose amount is decreasing (resp. increasing) with the child’s income. The middle income
class may give no family help at all, and its elderly members would be the main beneficiaries
of the introduction of social LTC transfers. We then provide several reasons for the stylized
fact that there are little social LTC transfers in most countries. First, social transfers are
dominated by help in time by the family when the intrinsic preference of dependent parents for
the latter is large enough. Second, when the probability of becoming dependent is lower than
one third, the children of autonomous parents are numerous enough to oppose democratically
the introduction of social LTC transfers. Third, even when none of the first two conditions
is satisfied, the majority voting equilibrium may entail no social transfers, especially if the
probability of becoming dependent when old is not far above one third. This equilibrium may
be local (meaning that it would be defeated by the introduction of a sufficiently large social
program). This local majority equilibrium may be empirically relevant whenever new programs
have to be introduced at a low scale before being eventually ramped up.
Keywords: Majority Voting, local Condorcet winner, crowding out, intrinsic preference for
informal help, tax reform.
JEL codes: H55, I13, D91.
1 Introduction
Long Term Care (LTC hereafter) is defined as the care needed by people who are unable to per-
form alone activities of daily living (such as bathing, dressing, eating, getting in and out of bed,
toileting and continence) or instrumental activities of daily living (preparing own meals, clean-
ing, laundry, taking medication, getting to places beyond walking distance, shopping, managing
money affairs and using the telephone/Internet). People in need of LTC are called dependent.
The loss of autonomy is most often associated with old age and should be clearly distinguished
from illness, disability and handicap. Financing and providing LTC is an important and growing
problem for all rich countries. The Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association (2012)
estimates that the chances of requiring LTC in Canada are one in ten by age 55, three in ten by
age 65 and five in ten by age 75. Although Canada’s population will not age quite as rapidly as
that in many other advanced countries, its LTC needs will nevertheless increase dramatically.
In 2036, 10 to 11 million Canadians will be aged 65 and older — more than double the 2009
figure of 4.7 million — and their numbers will continue to rise to some 12 to 15 million by 2061.
As a consequence, the number of dependent seniors is expected to triple over the next 50 years
(Grignon and Bernier, 2012 and Statistics Canada, 2010).
A major difference with health care is the importance of help from the family in coping with
dependency. This help can take two forms: in time (often called informal help) or in money.
Most seniors with LTC needs reside in their or their relatives’ home, and rely largely on volunteer
care from family members. These include seniors with severe impairments (unable to perform at
least four activities of daily living). In addition, many people who do pay for care in their home
also rely on some free services. The economic value of volunteer care is significant, although
estimates of it are highly uncertain (see Cremer et al., 2009).
The public LTC transfers are relatively small (at an average of 1.5% of GDP across 25
OECD countries in 2008), especially when compared to the estimated value of family care and
expenditure on health or pension systems (OECD, 2011). Public LTC programs provide either
cash benefits or in-kind services, which depend on the needs and on the financial resources of
the user.1 Indeed, one reason given to the relative lack of public LTC spending (and also, the
lack of private insurance) is precisely the importance of help from the family.
1OECD (2011, chapter 7) provides a detailed taxonomy of public LTC systems within the OECD. For broader
surveys on long term care, see Brown and Finkelstein (2011) and Cremer et al. (2009).
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We develop a model where agents choose the extent of both public LTC transfers (by majority
voting) and of financial and informal help to dependent parents. Our objective is twofold. First,
recent empirical evidence (detailed below) has emerged on the pattern of family help in time
and in money, and we want to shed light on these empirical regularities. For instance, we want
to understand how the type of family help given is affected by the income level of the help giver,
as well as the crowding out effects (if any) between public LTC transfers and the two forms of
family help. Second, and more importantly, we want to better understand how it is that so little
social LTC transfers are provided in reality.
We model a continuum of families, consisting of an old member (parent) and a young one
(child). Young individuals work and obtain labor income. Old agents are retired. The only
ex ante difference between families is the productivity of the child. All agents face the same
probability pi of becoming dependent when old. Children are altruistic towards their dependent
parent, and can help them in three different ways: in time, in money, or throught their support
of a social LTC transfer scheme, financed by a proportional tax on labor income, whose proceeds
serve a lump sum benefit to all dependent agents. We assume away labor income tax distortions,
in order to study the case most favorable to the introduction of a social LTC program. A very
important assumption is that, other things equal, parents prefer to benefit from one hour of help
by their child rather than by a professional. This assumption is in line with casual observations
and is supported by Pinquart and Sorensen (2002).2 We assume that the strength of this
preference is identical for all dependent agents.
The timing of decisions runs as follows. At each period, all agents (young and old) vote over
the proportional tax rate financing the social LTC transfers. Young agents then observe the
majority-chosen level of this tax rate, and complement with financial and informal family help.
The dependency status of the elderly in the family is already known when voting, so that our
approach models LTC transfers rather than insurance.3
We solve the model by backward induction and obtain the following results. First, low pro-
2It is also associated with the desire of most people to remain in their own homes for as long as possible.
Recent polling by the Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association, reported in Frank (2012) found that 77
percent of Canadians would prefer to stay in their homes as they age. See also Torjman (2013).
3The same assumption is made by Nuscheler and Roeder (2013), detailed in section 1.1. Costa Font et al.
(2014) contrast ex ante financing of LTC (such as insurance) with ex post financing (such as transfers, as in our
model). They find that most OECD countries’ LTC spending is financed by close to a fifty-fifty mix of ex-ante
and ex-post funding sources or that the spending relies heavily on ex-post funding sources. They also obtain
that OECD countries view the two forms of funding as substitutes rather than complements. We leave for future
research the explanation of this very interesting observation.
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ductivity children give help in time to their dependent parent, while high productivity children
prefer giving monetary help. The threshold child productivity determining the preferred type
of family help is driven by the preference of the dependent for help in time. The amount of help
in time (among low productivity children) decreases with productivity (because of the higher
opportunity cost of giving time) while monetary help increases with productivity (thanks to a
lower marginal utility of consumption of richer children). These comparative statics results are
reminiscent of those obtained by Pestieau and Sato (2006, 2008) who use a different model (see
section 1.1). Unlike them, we do not restrict ourselves to interior solutions for help of any type,
and we obtain that the “middle class” (i.e., families where the child’s productivity is neither
low nor high) may not give any family help to dependent agents. This result will play a very
important role in the determination of the majority chosen value of the tax rate. We also note
that the pattern of family help that we obtain is in line with the empirical evidence. Zissi-
mopoulos (2001) shows that the adult child transfers fewer hours of time and a greater amount
of money to his dependent parent as his wage rate increases. Couch et al. (1999) obtain that
time transfers respond negatively to wage rates of unmarried men and women, and of married
men, while money transfers respond positively to wage rates of married and unmarried men and
women. Sloan et al. (2002) find a positive and significant relationship between money transfers
to the parents and hourly wage of the child.
We then turn to the main results of the paper, namely why there are so little social LTC
transfers in OECD countries. We first show that these transfers crowd out family help. If the
intrinsic preference of dependent agents for informal family help is large enough, then nobody
most-prefers social transfers: poor children prefer to give time, while rich children prefer giving
money to their dependent parent. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to model
explicitly the relationship between preferences of the dependent for informal family help and the
lack of social LTC transfers.
In the rest of the paper, we assume that the intrinsic preference of dependent agents for
informal help is low enough that poor children actually prefer social LTC transfers to giving
time (at their most-preferred allocation), a necessary condition for the emergence of a social LTC
transfer program at the majority voting equilibrium. We show that the availability of social
transfers, compared to the situation where only family help is available, benefits dependent
parents both at the intensive and extensive margins (with a shrinking of the set of productivity
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levels for which dependent parents receive no help at all). In that sense, the introduction of
social transfers benefits especially the “middle-income class” which is reminiscent of Director’s
law (Stigler, 1970). Moving then to the majority voting equilibrium, we first note that the
probability of becoming dependent must be large enough (above one third) for a positive amount
of social LTC transfers to be selected. This assumption looks empirically realistic (see the first
paragraphs of this Introduction for instance, as well as Brown and Finkelstein, 2009). The
main technical difficulty we then face is that preferences of dependent parents are not always
single-peaked in the social contribution rate. This is due to the crowding out effect of social
contributions on family help: the utility of some dependent parents first decreases with the
tax rate (because a higher tax rate decreases the help they receive from their family) and then
increases with it (when family help is totally crowded out, so that the only help received is the
social transfer). Those agents then have V-shaped preferences over the tax rate. We identify a
condition on crowding out of family help by social transfers which guarantees that the preferences
of all agents (young and old) satisfy the single-crossing property (Gans and Smart, 1996 and
Epple and Romano, 1996).
We provide a joint condition on the probability of becoming dependent and on the distribu-
tion of productivities under which the majority voting equilibrium tax rate is nil. This condition
is likely to be satisfied if the probability of becoming dependent is close enough to one third. We
also look for a weaker equilibrium concept (a local Condorcet winner) where a majority of voters
prefers this tax rate to any other value in a neighborhood. We provide a condition under which
the local Condorcet winning value of the tax rate is nil. This raises an interesting possibility for
why there are so little social LTC transfers: a majority may dislike small social LTC programs
(because they crowd out part of family help) while actually preferring much larger programs,
which totally crowd out family help but generate large social transfers. If policy changes are
mainly incremental, so that new programs are small and then grow other time (which is the
case of most social programs introduced since the beginning of the 20th century), a local Con-
dorcet winning value of the tax rate of zero may prevent the emergence of a social LTC transfer
program.
Finally, we identify the possibility of a positive tax rate at equilibrium, supported by poor
members of families with a dependent elderly. In that case, the equilibrium allocation is such
that children of dependent parents whose income is sufficiently different from the decisive voter’s
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income complement the social transfers with help in time (for low income levels) or in money
(for high income levels), while intermediate income levels (close to the decisive voter’s income)
rely exclusively on social transfers.
We now turn to the related literature.
1.1 Literature
There is a growing empirical literature on family help and its substitutability with social LTC
transfers. We mention this literature either above, or when we introduce a specific assumption
in the model (see after Assumption 1, and Lemma 1). We then concentrate here on theoretical
papers.
The papers closest to ours in their setting are Pestieau and Sato (2008) and especially
Pestieau and Sato (2006). They both model families differing in the productivity of the child
and whether the parent is dependent or not, as in our model. Their approach differs from ours
on several counts. First, they model the advent of dependency as a utility loss, while all types
of help bring utility gains, with the utility function for consumption unaffected. We believe
our formulation, using state-dependent preferences, to be more in line with the recent empirical
literature, such as Finkelstein et al. (2013). Second, they model a first stage decision where
parents donate gifts to their children as a form of LTC insurance. Such a stage is not included in
our model.4 Third, and more important, they take a normative approach while ours is positive.
They study various tax and transfer policies and conclude that the optimal policy “depends
on its effect on parental gifts, on children’s labor supply, on the distribution of wages and on
consumption inequality between parents and children and between children having dependent
parents and children having healthy parents.” Pestieau and Sato (2008) build on the same model
and introduce public and private nursing facilities, as well as private insurance.
Other papers also adopt a normative viewpoint and study the optimal public LTC policies
in the presence of family help. Jousten et al. (2005) focus on families with different levels of
altruism. Given the cost of public funds, the central planner tries to induce the more altruistic
families to assist their dependent parents and to restrict aid to the dependent elderly whose
children are less altruistic. This may imply a quantity of public LTC lower than its first-best
level. Pestieau and Sato (2009) consider a society segmented into altruistic and non altruistic
4Sloan et al. (1997) find little empirical support for the hypothesis that care giving by children is motivated
by the prospect of receiving bequests from their parents.
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families and also into poor and rich families. Private insurance is available. In a world of perfect
information, a redistributive government helps the low income families. In altruistic families,
the dependent parents are taken care of by their children. In non altruistic families, if needed,
parents are given the means to purchase private LTC insurance. They then introduce asymmetric
information and show that it implies less redistribution towards the two target populations: the
poor elderly with non altruistic children and the poor altruistic families. Cremer and Roeder
(2013) study a setting where children are purely selfish, and neither side can make credible
commitments (which rules out efficient bargaining). They show that a positive level of family
help is provided as long as the bequest motive is operative. They study how the provision of
LTC can be improved by public policies under various informational assumptions. Interestingly,
crowding out of private aid by public LTC is not a problem in their setting. Public insurance
may even enhance the provision of family aid under certain circumstances.
There are fewer papers taking a positive approach to understanding LTC public policies.
De Donder and Leroux (2013) study whether behavioral biases may explain the lack of social
LTC insurance. They develop a model where individuals vote over the social LTC insurance
contribution rate before buying additional private insurance and saving. They study three
types of behavioral biases, all having in common that agents under-weight their dependency
probability when taking private decisions. Sophisticated procrastinators anticipate their mistake
when voting, while optimistic and myopic agents have preferences that are consistent across
choices. Optimists under-estimate their own probability of becoming dependent but know the
average probability while myopics underestimate both. Sophisticated procrastinators attain the
first-best allocation while myopics and optimists insure too little and save too much. Myopics
and optimists more (resp., less) biased than the median are worse off (resp., better off), at the
majority voting equilibrium, when private insurance is available than when it is not.
De Donder and Pestieau (2015) study the political determination of the level of social LTC
insurance when voters can top up with private insurance, saving and family help in money.
Agents differ in income, probability of becoming dependent and of receiving family help, and
amount of family help received. Social insurance redistributes across income and risk levels,
while private insurance is actuarially fair. The income-to-dependency probability ratio of agents
determines whether they prefer social or private insurance. Family support crowds out the
demand for both social and, especially, private insurance, as strong prospects of family help
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drive the demand for private insurance to zero. The availability of private insurance decreases
the demand for social insurance but need not decrease its majority chosen level. A majority of
voters would oppose banning private insurance.
Nuscheler and Roeder (2013)’s aim is to explain income redistribution and public financing
of LTC, in a setting where voters differ in income and in LTC needs and where a proportional
income tax finances both a lump-sum and a LTC transfer. They have four groups of agents (two
income levels, dependent and autonomous) and assume that the fraction of dependent parents
is larger than one half. They show that a structure-induced equilibrium always exists, that it
is unique if informal care is provided in equilibrium, and that it is consistent with the negative
correlation observed between income inequality and LTC public financing.
We now present our modelling assumptions, before solving for the individual decisions and
then deriving the majority voting equilibrium.
2 The model
The economy is composed of a continuum of agents who live two periods of length T . All
agents have a unique child at the end of the first period, so that at any point in time there
is a continuum of families composed of one parent and one child. All agents have the same
probability pi of becoming dependent at the beginning of their second period. By the law of
large numbers, there is then a fraction pi of families with a dependent elderly at any point in
time.
Children are altruistic towards their parent when the latter is dependent.5 They can help
their parent through three channels: by giving (informal) help in time, e, by making a direct
financial transfer f and through a social LTC transfer system serving a lump sum amount b to
all dependent agents. All decisions affect the current period only. More precisely, we assume
that the future, second period utility of an individual currently young is not affected by his
decisions when young, so we can concentrate on his instantaneous utility.6
5We are interested in how much (more) young agents help their parent in case of dependency, so that any help
to a non-dependent parent can be subsumed in the existing model. Note that we also assume away altruism from
parents to children to focus on help by children to parents. See section 4 of Cremer et al. (2009) for a survey of
strategic considerations related to family solidarity, including strategic bequests.
6Pestieau and Sato (2006, 2008) make the same assumption, although it remains implicit in their setting. This
assumption requires that we assume away saving, strategic interactions between parents and children (such as
exchanges of help for bequests) and that the size of the public LTC program is chosen at each period. See footnote
4 for the lack of strategic motivations for family help, and footnote 13 for a defense of the last assumption above.
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We denote the instantaneous utility of an individual as U ij , where j ∈ {Y,O} denotes whether
he is young (Y ) or old (O), and where i ∈ {D,N} denotes whether the old member of his family
(namely himself if j = O or his parent if j = Y ) is dependent (D) or not (N). At the time they
take decisions, young agents do know the dependency status of their parent.
The utility a young agent obtains from consuming c is represented by the increasing and
strictly concave utility function u(c). If an agent remains autonomous in old age, his preferences
for consumption do not change and are represented by the same utility function u(d), where
d measures consumption when old. The utility function of a dependent elderly is denoted by
v(d, e).7 We assume that v is increasing and concave in both consumption d and informal help
e. We discuss the function v(.) later in this section, once all notations have been introduced.
Starting with the parents, we have that
UNO = u(d),
UDO = v (d, e) .
Individuals do not work in the second period of their life, but all receive the same income p¯. This
income can be considered as a second-period endowment, as in Pestieau and Sato (2006, 2008),
or as a pension financed by (unmodelled) contributions, for instance. The important assumption
is that p¯ is the same for all.8 We then have that d = p¯ for autonomous parents, while dependent
parents may also receive financial transfers from their child and from the government, so that
their consumption level is given by
d = p¯+ f + b.
Old agents take no decision but simply consume their income and benefit from informal help, if
any.
As for the children, we have that9
UNY = u(c),
UDY = u(c) + αv (d, e) ,
7Finkelstein et al. (2013) show that the marginal utility from consumption varies with health status.
8We leave for future research the case where old agents differ in income, and where children and parental
income within a family are correlated.
9We can either assume that v(d, e) < 0 or subtract a constant term large enough in the definition of UDY to
make sure that UNY > U
D
Y . Note that this does not affect our analysis, since children do not choose to make their
parent dependent or not.
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where α > 0 is an altruism parameter, identical across children.
We now turn to the determination of the children consumption level, and of the social LTC
transfers. Young agents differ in their productivity w, which is distributed over [w−, w+] accord-
ing to the cdf F (w), with the median productivity, wmed, lower than the average productivity,
w¯. They all supply a unit of labor time in return for a gross wage equal to their productivity
w. Wage income is taxed at a proportional rate τ ∈ [0, 1], with the proceeds used to finance
the lump sum transfer b to all dependent agents (a pay-as-you-go social LTC transfer program).
The government budget balance equation is given by10
b(τ) =
τw¯
pi
.
Young agents with dependent parents choose how to allocate the remainder of their time, T −1.
They choose the amount of time e that they spend helping their parent (informal help, with 0 ≤
e ≤ T −1). The time spent neither working in the taxed sector nor helping one’s parent is spent
earning an income equal to one’s productivity and not taxed (for instance by moonlighting in the
underground economy, or because overtime work is not subject to social insurance contributions,
as was the case in France between 2007 and 2012). The after-tax income of a young agent of
productivity w providing an amount e of informal help to his dependent parent is then equal
to11
w(1− τ) + (T − 1− e)w = w(T − e− τ).
The important characteristic of this formulation is that informal help has an opportunity cost
for young agents, so that such help is more costly for more productive agents.
Independently of their choice of e, young agents can also help their dependent parent finan-
cially by making a monetary transfer f . Young agents then consume
c = w(T − τ − e)− f.
Before turning to the choice of family help and of social transfers to dependent individuals,
we introduce several assumptions used throughout the paper. We take as numeraire the market
wage of a professional helper of dependent people (such as a nurse or a specialized caretaker).
Hence, e denotes both the amount of time spent with dependent parents and the market cost
10Assuming away labor income tax distortions biases the model in favor of the introduction of social LTC
transfers - see footnote 18 for the impact of introducing distortions.
11This formulation will prove easier to handle than the alternative where all labor income is taxed, so that
after-tax income is w(T − e)(1− τ). This does not change our results qualitatively.
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of this time, if it were spent by a professional care taker. The monetary transfers received from
the State and from the family can be used, among others, to buy formal services –i.e., help from
professionals and specialized caretakers. Pinquart and Sorensen (2002) show that dependent
individuals in general prefer informal help, or a combination of informal and formal support, to
purely formal support, at least for short term needs. We model this observation as the following
assumption.
Assumption 1 The instantaneous utility of dependent individuals has the form
v(d, e) = φ (d+ βe) ,
with β > 1 and the function φ(.) increasing and strictly concave.
Assumption 1 has two main consequences. First, the premium that dependent parents put
on informal help from their child (compared to monetary help) is a constant β:
ve (d, e) = βvd (d, e) .
We call the parameter β the intensity of the preference for informal help of dependent parents.
In our setting, a dependent elderly values one more hour of informal family help as much as β
hours of a professional care taker (or β times the market cost of one hour of professional help).
The parameter β is identical across agents.
Second, Assumption 1 implies that help in time and in money are substitutes, that is
ved (d, e) = βφ
′′ (.) < 0. This substitutability is borne out in general (see the recent papers
like Bonsang (2007, 2009), Charles and Sevak (2005), Van Houtven and Norton (2004)), except
in specific cases, such as when specialized help is required which can not be offered by the family.
Finally, we will make use of the following assumption:12
Assumption 2 The coefficient of relative risk aversion is lower than one for (a) autonomous
agents
−u
′′(c)c
u′(c)
≤ 1,
12Karagyozova and Siegelman (2012) review the empirical literature on relative risk aversion. They report
several studies which find a coefficient of relative risk aversion lower than one. Hansen and Singleton (1983)
evaluate it to be between [0.35, 1]; Holt and Laury (2002) elicit the distribution of coefficients of relative risk
aversion and find that 64% of respondents had a coefficient comprised between 0.15 and 0.97. Chetty (2006)
finds that “using 33 sets of estimates of wage and income elasticities, the mean implied value of (the coefficient
of relative risk aversion) is 0.71, with a range of 0.15 to 1.78 in the additive utility case.” Assumption 2 is then
reasonable.
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as well as (b) for dependent agents
−φ
′′(x)x
φ′(x)
≤ 1.
We now turn to the determination of family help and social LTC transfers.
3 The determination of family help and social LTC transfers
All agents (young and old) vote over the size τ ∈ [0, 1] of the social LTC transfer program.
Young individuals observe the result of the vote and then decide privately the amounts of family
help, informal and financial, to their dependent parent. The dependency status of parents is
known to all both when voting and when taking private decisions. We assume that voting takes
place in each period, so that second period utility of agents young at the time of voting is not
affected, but will be determined by the next vote, which takes place when they reach old age.13
It is straightforward to see that young agents with an autonomous parent favor no LTC
transfers at all (e = f = τ = 0). Similarly, old agents who are autonomous are indifferent about
the level of τ , since they do not pay labor income taxes nor receive any transfer. We thus focus
in the next two subsections on young individuals with a dependent parent and on dependent
elderly voters.
3.1 Children with a dependent parent
Using the government budget constraint together with the definition of consumption levels c
and d, we obtain that
UDY = u(w(T − τ − e)− f) + αv (p¯+ f + τw¯/pi, e) .
We solve the model backward, starting with the optimal amounts of the two forms of family help
as a function of the exogenously chosen social transfer program size τ . The FOCs for family
13The assumption that the result of a vote would hold for decades does not seem reasonable to us. The
literature on the political economy of pensions often assumes that voting takes place once and for all (see for
instance, Casamatta et al., 2000 and Cremer et al., 2007), but this assumption is a pis-aller to explain the
emergence of pay-as-you-go social transfer schemes in the absence of altruism. The presence of altruism in our
model makes the unpalatable assumption of voting once and for all not necessary.
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help in money and in time are given by
FOCf =
∂UDY
∂f
= −u′ (c) + αvd (p¯+ f + τw¯/pi, e) ≤ 0, (1)
FOCe =
∂UDY
∂e
= −wu′ (c) + αve (p¯+ f + τw¯/pi, e)
= −wu′ (c) + αβvd (p¯+ f + τw¯/pi, e) ≤ 0 (2)
Comparison of the two FOCs allows us to state the following proposition, where the most-
preferred levels of variables are denoted as f∗(τ, w) and e∗(τ, w), which we abbreviate as f∗ and
e∗ when this shortened notation is non ambiguous.
Proposition 1 Young agents with a dependent parent
(a) prefer to give financial rather than informal help (f∗ > 0, e∗ = 0) if their wage is larger
than the intensity of the preference for informal help of dependent parents (w > β),
(b) prefer informal to financial family help (f∗ = 0, e∗ > 0) otherwise (w < β).
(c) Except when w = β (where they are indifferent as to the specific mix of financial and informal
family help but rather care about the monetary value of total family help using their opportunity
cost for informal help, f + we), they never give simultaneously financial and informal family
help, i.e. (f∗ > 0, e∗ > 0) is not an equilibrium.
Proof. (a) For any pair (e > 0, f > 0), we have that FOCf > FOCe when w > β. Choosing
f∗ > 0, we have that FOCf = 0 > FOCe for any e, so that e∗ = 0 and (f∗ > 0, e∗ = 0) is an
equilibrium. There is no equilibrium with e∗ > 0 since FOCf > FOCe = 0 implies that there is
no equilibrium value for f .
(b) is proven likewise for β > w.
(c) The proofs of (a) and (b) show that (e∗ > 0, f∗ > 0) cannot be an equilibrium when
w 6= β. If β = w, then FOCf = FOCe for all pair (e, f). Equalizing FOCf to zero and using
Assumption 1, we obtain that
u′(w(T − τ)− [f + we]) = αφ′(p¯+ τw¯/pi + [f + we]),
so that f + we has to be set at the adequate level.
Children of a dependent elderly compare their opportunity cost of giving informal help, w,
with the intensity of the preference of the elderly for informal help, β, and choose informal help if
they are sufficiently unproductive (w < β) and financial help otherwise (w > β). The only case
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where they are indifferent between both is when the opportunity cost of informal help equals its
benefit for the parent (w = β).
We now perform some comparative statics analysis of the most-preferred level of family help,
starting with the informal help provided by low productivity agents.
Proposition 2 For all children of dependent parents with w < β, the most-preferred level of
informal help, e∗,
(a) decreases with w ,
(b) increases with β
(c) decreases with τ . Moreover, informal help is a perfect substitute to social LTC transfer
(de∗/dτ = −1) when β = w¯/pi, and decreases faster than τ (de∗/dτ < −1) when β < w¯/pi and
more slowly than τ (de∗/dτ > −1) when β > w¯/pi.
Proof. (a) By the implicit function theorem applied to (2) with f = 0, we obtain
sign
(
de∗
dw
)
= sign
(−u′ (c)− cu′′ (c))
which is negative or null under Assumption 2(a).
(b) Proceeding in the same manner with β, using Assumption 1, we obtain that
sign
(
de∗
dβ
)
= sign
(
α
[
φ′ (p¯+ τw¯/pi + βe∗) + βe∗φ′′ (p¯+ τw¯/pi + βe∗)
])
,
which is strictly positive given Assumption 2(b).
(c) Proceeding in the same manner with τ , using Assumption 1, we obtain that
de
dτ
= −w
2u′′ (c) + α (w¯/pi)βφ′′ (.)
w2u′′ (c) + αβ2φ′′ (.)
< 0. (3)
The rest of the proof is straightforward.
The intuition for part (a) is that an increase in w has two countervailing effects on informal
family help: it increases the monetary opportunity cost of informal help (inducing less help)
but it also decreases the marginal utility of consumption when young (inducing more help).
Assumption 2 makes sure that the latter effect is low enough that the net impact of a larger
income on informal help is negative.
The intuition for part (b) is similar in that a larger value of β also has two countervailing
impacts on e∗: increasing β has both a positive direct impact on the marginal utility of informal
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help for the dependent parent but also, given Assumption 1, a negative indirect impact (since
a larger value of β for a given informal help amount e translates into a lower marginal utility
of the dependent agent). Assumption 2(b) guarantees that the former impact is larger than the
latter, so that a larger value of β translates into more such help given by agents with w < β.
Part (c) first establishes that the social LTC transfer crowds out the supply of informal
help: as τ increases, the marginal utility cost of giving help increases, while the marginal benefit
decreases. When the financial return of the social transfer tax, w¯/pi, is equal to the intensity of
the preference of the dependent elderly for informal help, β, the two forms of help are perfect
substitutes. When β < w¯/pi, (resp., β > w¯/pi) the return of social transfer is larger (resp.,
smaller) than the “psychological return” of informal help, and the amount of informal help e∗
provided decreases more (resp. less) than the value of the social transfer contribution rate, τ .
We have a similar (but not equivalent) proposition for the comparative statics analysis of
financial family help given by more productive agents.
Proposition 3 For all children of dependent parents with w > β, the most-preferred level of
financial help, f∗,
(a) increases with w,
(b) is independent of β,
(c) decreases with τ . Moreover, financial help is a perfect substitute to social LTC transfer
(df∗/dτ = −w¯/pi, so that the total monetary value of help τw¯/pi + f∗ is unchanged) when
w = w¯/pi, and decreases faster than τ (df∗/dτ < −w¯/pi, so that the total monetary value of help
τw¯/pi+ f∗ decreases) when w > w¯/pi and more slowly than τ (df∗/dτ > −w¯/pi, so that the total
monetary value of help τw¯/pi + f∗ increases) when w < w¯/pi.
Proof. (a) By the implicit function theorem applied to (1) with e = 0, we obtain
sign
(
df∗
dw
)
= sign
(−(T − τ)u′′ (c)) > 0.
(b) Immediate since (1) does not depend on β when e = 0.
(c) Proceeding similarly with respect to τ , we obtain
df∗
dτ
= −wu
′′ (c) + α (w¯/pi)φ′′ (.)
u′′ (c) + αφ′′ (.)
< 0. (4)
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The rest of the proof is straightforward
The intuition for part (a) is that a larger child’s income decreases his marginal cost of
giving, inducing him to transfer more money to his dependent parent. Propositions 2(a) and
3(a) are supported by several empirical papers, which are listed in section 1. The intensity of
the preference for informal help of the parent has no impact on the amount of financial transfer
made by the child as long as he is sufficiently productive that he prefers helping his parent
financially rather than informally.
Family help in money is a substitute to social LTC transfers: as τ increases, the marginal
cost of giving increases while the marginal benefit decreases, inducing a lower level of direct
financial help. When w = w¯/pi, both forms of help are perfect substitutes (because they have
the same marginal cost and benefit for the helper), so that the total monetary value of the
transfers, τw¯/pi + f∗, remains unchanged when τ increases. When w¯/pi < w, (resp., w¯/pi > w)
social transfers have a lower (resp., higher) return than direct family transfers, so that total
monetary transfers decrease (resp., increase) with τ .
An important lesson to draw from these two propositions is that both the monetary (f∗+e∗)
and the psychological (f∗ + βe∗) value of family help are at their minimum for middle income
agents–i.e., agents with w = β > 1 (recall the numeraire is the wage of a professional care taker).
Indeed, every agent with w < β chooses e∗ > 0 which is decreasing in w up to w = β while
every agent with w > β prefers f∗ > 0 which is increasing in w.
Note also that agents with w = β wish to help (financially or informally) their elderly parent
provided that the following condition is satisfied
u′(β(T − τ)) < αφ′(p¯+ τ w¯
pi
). (5)
This condition is satisfied provided (i) that agents are sufficiently altruistic (α large enough),
(ii) that dependent elderly resources in the absence of family help are low enough (low p¯, τ and
low return of social transfer w¯/pi) and (iii) that help is not too costly for the child (thanks to a
low contribution rate τ , a large amount of available time T and a large productivity w = β).
When condition (5) is not satisfied, the middle class prefers not to provide any (financial or
informal) family help, as exemplified in Figure 1.14
We now move to the first stage of the model and study the individually most-preferred social
14All figures are based on the following assumptions: u(x) = 2
√
x, v(d, e) = ln[d+ βe], pi = 0.5, w¯ = 5, T = 2,
p¯ = 4, β = 5. In Figure 1, we assume moreover that τ = 0 and α = 1.
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Figure 1: Most-preferred family help as a function of income when condition (5) is not satisfied.
transfer contribution rate τ of young agents with a dependent parent. The FOC for τ is given
by
FOCτ =
∂UDY
∂τ
= −wu′ (c) + αw¯
pi
vd (p¯+ f + τw¯/pi, e) = 0, (6)
while the FOCs for f and e remain given by (1) and (2).
We obtain the following proposition.15
Proposition 4 Among the children with a dependent parent,
(a) those with high productivity prefer to make only direct financial transfers: f∗ ≥ 0, τ∗ = e∗ =
0 if w > max[β, w¯/pi].
(b) those with low productivity prefer exclusively social transfers if w¯/pi > β: τ∗ ≥ 0, f∗ = e∗ = 0
if w < max[β, w¯/pi] = w¯/pi.
(c) those with low productivity prefer exclusively informal help if w¯/pi < β: e∗ ≥ 0, f∗ = τ∗ = 0
if w < max[β, w¯/pi] = β.
(d) A necessary and sufficient condition for every child to have a strictly positive most-preferred
transfer is
u′(T max[β, w¯/pi]) < αφ′(p¯).
Proof. See Appendix
15In order to focus on empirically relevant situations and not to multiply cases, we assume from now on that
no young agent with a dependent parent most prefers τ∗ ≥ 1, which could in theory occur in our setting with
untaxed labor income w(T − 1). This condition is satisfied if
wu′(w(T − 1)) > αw¯
pi
φ′(p¯+
w¯
pi
).
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The intuition for Proposition 4 is clear. Very productive children prefer to make a direct
financial transfer to their elderly parent, because the other two forms of transfers have a higher
marginal cost (opportunity cost for informal help, tax bill for social transfer). Less produc-
tive children shun direct financial transfers and compare the returns of the other two forms of
help (which have the same marginal cost), namely the intrinsic preference for informal help of
dependent parents, β, and the financial return of social transfers, w¯/pi. They most-prefer the
transfer with the highest return. Observe that these returns are independent of the individual
characteristic, namely the productivity level w.
Overall, if β > w¯/pi, social transfers are dominated by informal help for all children with
dependent parents, and the choice between f and e, as well as the comparative statics analysis
of their most-preferred form of help, remains as described in Propositions 2 and 3: agents with
income w < β provide informal help while those with w > β prefer direct financial help.
In that case, there cannot be a majoritarian support for social transfers, since no young agent
supports it. A large intrinsic preference for informal help may then explain why we observe so
little social LTC transfers. To go beyond this result, we assume from now on that β < w¯/pi.
In that case, informal help is dominated by the social transfer, so that no one most-prefers a
positive value of e, and the most-preferred form of help is either social transfers (for children
with w < w¯/pi) or direct financial transfers (for children with w > w¯/pi). The next proposition
studies the comparative statics properties of τ∗.
Proposition 5 Assume that β < w¯/pi. Individuals with w < w¯/pi are such that:
(i) Their most-preferred social LTC contribution rate τ∗ (a) decreases with w, (b) is independent
of β, (c) decreases with pi.
(ii) Their most-preferred social LTC transfer, b∗, is larger than βe∗(0, w), where e∗(0, w) is their
optimal informal help amount when taxation is not available.
Proof. See Appendix
The intuition for part (i) (a) is similar to that of Proposition 2(a), as an increase in w has
two countervailing effects on the preferences for τ : it increases the monetary opportunity cost
of the social transfer (inducing a lower value of τ) but also decreases the marginal utility of
consumption when young (inducing a higher value of τ). Assumption 2(a) makes sure that
the latter effect is small enough that the net impact of a larger income on the most-preferred
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amount of social transfer is negative. As for the intensity of the preference for informal help
by the elderly, it plays no role in the determination of τ∗, as long as β < w¯/pi so that informal
help is dominated by social transfers. Finally, as the fraction of dependent individuals increases,
the preferred tax rate decreases. On the one hand, the return agents can expect to obtain from
taxation decreases, increasing the cost of a given social transfer. On the other hand, raising
pi increases the marginal utility from obtaining this transfer when old, for a given τ . Under
assumption 2(b) the former effect dominates the latter, so that τ decreases with pi.
The intuition for part (ii) is that the social program offers a better return than informal
help when β < w¯/pi, so that agents are willing to contribute more to the social program than
they would give informal help if the social program were not available. The dependent parents
of those agents then benefit from the introduction of the social program (at the most-preferred
allocation of their child) because they receive more help, both at the intensive margin (as shown
in part (ii)) but also at the extensive margin, as the set of middle-class agents who do not help
their dependent parent shrinks – see Figure 2– (and may even disappear, as in Figure 3) when
the social program is made available.16
We now turn to the preferences of dependent parents for the social transfer program.
Figure 2: Most-preferred help as a function of income when α = 0.85.
16Figures 2 and 3 differ only in the value of α. In both figures, all agents prefer either τ∗ > 0 or f∗ > 0. The
curve βe∗ corresponds to the most-preferred value of e∗ when τ is set at zero (as in Figure 1), and is depicted to
allow the comparison with τ∗w¯/pi when τ∗ is set at its most-preferred level for individual w.
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Figure 3: Most-preferred help as a function of income when α = 1.
3.2 Dependent parents
Using the government budget constraint as well as the formula for second-period consumption,
the utility function of an elderly dependent becomes
UDO = v
(
p¯+ f∗(τ, w) + τ
w¯
pi
, e∗(τ, w)
)
,
where the amount of family help received (e∗ and f∗) is chosen by his child of productivity
w. The elderly dependent determines his most-preferred social transfer contribution rate τ∗ by
taking into account the crowding out of family help by the social transfer (see Propositions 2(c)
and 3(c)). We obtain the following proposition.17
Proposition 6 Assume β < w¯/pi.
(a) Dependent parents of a low productivity child (w < β) most-prefer τ∗ = 1.
(b) Dependent parents of a child with income w ∈ [β, w¯/pi] most-prefer τ∗ = 1.
(c) There exists a threshold productivity level w˘ > w¯/pi such that dependent parents of a child
with income w ∈ [w¯/pi, w˘[ most-prefer τ∗ = 1 while those with a child with income w ≥ w˘
most-prefer τ∗ = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Part (a) of Proposition 6 tackles the case where the child’s productivity is low enough (w < β)
that family help is provided in an informal way. Social transfers crowd out informal help, and
17The case where β > w¯/pi is available upon request but not reported here since the majority chosen value of
τ is zero in that case.
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it may then be surprising that parents prefer τ∗ = 1, for two reasons. First, it is precisely
the lowest income children who give the most informal help (see Proposition 2 (a)). Second,
Proposition 2 (c) has established that de∗/dτ < −1 when β < w¯/pi–i.e., that the crowding out
is intense since informal help decreases faster than τ . Despite this, Proposition 6 (a) shows
that the total value of the transfers received, τw¯/pi+ βe∗, increases with τ as soon as β < w¯/pi.
Dependent parents then prefer to totally crowd out informal help by their child and most-prefer
the highest admissible value of τ .18
Parts (b) and (c) study the case where any help from the family takes the form of monetary
transfers (because w > β). The intuition for part (b) is similar to the one developed in the
previous paragraph: even though social transfers crowd out family help, the total value of the
transfer received, τw¯/pi + f∗, increases with τ when w < w¯/pi (see Proposition 3(c)) and old
dependents prefer to totally crowd out family help and most-prefer τ∗ = 1. When w > w¯/pi as
in part (c), the crowding out of family by social transfers happens so fast that the total transfer
received decreases. When τ is large enough, family help is totally crowded out, and the (social)
transfer increases with τ , so that dependent parents have V shaped preferences over τ . When w
is lower than a threshold w˘ (defined in the Appendix), the maximum monetary transfer received
from the family (when τ = 0) is small enough that old dependents prefer to totally crowd out
family help and choose τ∗ = 1. When w is larger than w˘, dependent parents prefer the maximum
family transfer (corresponding to τ = 0) to the maximum social transfer (when τ = 1). In a
nutshell, dependent parents prefer the largest social LTC transfer system (τ∗ = 1), even at the
cost of totally crowding out family help, except if their child is rich enough (w > w˘) that he
transfers more money than the maximum social transfer available.
Note that w˘ > w¯/pi –i.e., the threshold child’s income above which agents in a family with
a dependent member prefer τ = 0 is larger for parents than for children, because the former do
not consider the utility cost for their child of paying the contribution but focus on the benefit
they receive. In other words, families where the child income is in-between w¯/pi and w˘ disagree
on the form that the LTC transfer should take, with children preferring direct monetary help
from the family while parents prefer social transfers.
We now study the majority voting equilibrium over τ .
18Introducing labor income tax distortions would have two effects: (i) shrinking the set of agents who most-
favor positive contribution rates and (ii) for those who do, the most-preferred value of τ would be the interior one
maximizing the tax proceeds.
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3.3 The majority voting equilibrium
As stated at the beginning of Section 3, autonomous parents are indifferent as to the value of
τ , so that we suppose that they abstain and do not vote.19 Voters are then composed of three
groups: young with dependent parents, young with autonomous parents and old dependent
agents. The next lemma looks at the relative size of these groups.
Lemma 1 No group forms a majority by itself when voting provided that pi > 1/3.
Proof. With a unitary mass of agents in each generation and two generations voting simulta-
neously, the total mass of voters is 1 + pi (all young plus the dependent elderly). Young voters
with a dependent parent, and dependent parents, never form a majority by themselves since
pi < (1 + pi)/2 ⇔ pi < 1. The condition for children of autonomous parents not to form a
majority is 1− pi < (1 + pi)/2⇔ pi > 1/3.
Since children with autonomous parents prefer no social insurance transfers, a necessary
condition for a positive value of τ to emerge from majority voting is that pi > 1/3. This
condition is empirically reasonable. For instance, according to Brown and Finkelstein (2009), in
the US, “the probability that a 65 year old individual will use a nursing home at some point in
his or her life is quite substantial, with estimates ranging from 35 to nearly 50 percent”.20 We
assume from now on that pi > 1/3.
The main difficulty with proving the existence of a majority-voting equilibrium is due to
the fact that the preferences of the old dependent with w ≥ w¯/pi are not single peaked (see
proposition 6(c)). We then define a global (resp., local) Condorcet winner, τGCW (resp., τLCW )
as a value of τ that is preferred to any other value τ ∈ [0, 1] (resp., to any value of τ ∈ [0, 1] in
a neighborhood of τLCW ) by a majority of voters.
The next proposition studies the conditions under which the absence of social LTC transfers
(τ = 0) is a (global or local) Condorcet winner. Recall that we concentrate on the case where
β < w¯/pi, as this constitutes a necessary condition for young agents to prefer the LTC social
transfer to family help.
19Alternatively, we could assume that they throw a dice to determine which value of τ to vote for. This would
not affect our results.
20See also Torjman (2013).
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Proposition 7 When β < w¯/pi and pi > 1/3, τ = 0 is
(a) the global Condorcet winner if
1 + pi [1− (F (w¯/pi) + F (w˘))] ≥ 1 + pi
2
, (7)
(b) a local Condorcet winner if
1− pi + 2pi [1− F (w¯/pi)] ≥ 1 + pi
2
. (8)
Proposition 7 studies the conditions under which τ = 0 maximizes (locally or globally) the
utility of a majority of voters. The RHS of (7) measures the total mass of voters while its LHS
gives the mass of agents who prefer τ = 0 to any other value of τ ∈ [0, 1],
(1− pi) + pi(1− F (w¯/pi)) + pi(1− F (w˘)),
where the first term measures the mass of children with autonomous parents, the second the
mass of young agents with dependent parents who prefer giving direct financial family help to
paying for social transfers (see Proposition 4(a)), and the third term the mass of dependent
parents who prefer no social transfer in order not to crowd out the financial family help they
receive (see Proposition 6(c)).
To obtain the (weaker) condition (8) for τ = 0 to be a local Condorcet winner, we add to
the LHS of (7) the mass of individuals whose utility is locally decreasing in τ from τ = 0, even
though τ = 0 is not their most-preferred tax rate – namely, the parents whose child’s income
w ∈ [w¯/pi, w˘] (see equation (12) in the Appendix).
We now show that conditions (7) and (8) can actually be satisfied. The LHS of (7) is
minimum when F (w¯/pi) and F (w˘) are both close to one, so that it is close to 1 − pi. Observe
that 1 − pi > (1 + pi)/2 implies that pi < 1/3. So, as long as F (w¯/pi) < F (w˘) < 1, there
exist values of pi slightly larger than 1/3 (i.e., satisfying Lemma 1) such that τ = 0 is a global
Condorcet winner. Condition (8) is easier to satisfy since the LHS of (8) is larger than the LHS
of (7) (given that F (w¯/pi) < F (w˘)) so that, by the same reasoning as before, this condition is
satisfied for values of pi slightly larger than 1/3. It is indeed quite intuitive that a low prevalence
of dependency (a low pi) is conducive to an equilibrium with no social transfers. Notwithstanding
this remark, increasing pi has an ambiguous impact on the relative share, among voters, of those
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who favor τ = 0. Increasing pi reduces the return of the social LTC program, increasing the
fraction of voters in dependent families who most-prefer τ = 0.21 At the same time, there
are fewer children of autonomous parents who oppose any taxation. Although the net impact
of a higher pi on the LHS of (7) is positive, this is also true for the RHS–i.e., the fraction of
agents who cast a vote (since fewer autonomous elderly abstain). It is then by no way clear how
condition (7) is affected by an increase in pi. A similar reasoning applies to condition (8). We
obtain numerically, using a lognormal distribution of income, that both conditions are satisfied
provided that pi is not too large (the threshold level of pi being of course higher for condition (8)
than for (7)).
Proposition 7 shows that the absence of social LTC transfers can be a Condorcet winner
even when β < w¯/pi –i.e., in situations where some (young and old) agents most-prefer social
transfers rather than informal family help. The majority coalition is then made of children of
autonomous parents together with rich families with a dependent elderly.
The absence of social LTC transfer can also be a local, but not a global, Condorcet winner,
meaning that τ∗ = 0 can be defeated by a value of τ large enough that, for dependent parents
of middle-range income children (w ∈ [w¯/pi, w˘]), (i) direct financial help is totally crowded out,
and (ii) the social LTC transfer is larger than the financial family help that would have been
received in the absence of social LTC transfers.
The next proposition characterizes the (global or local) Condorcet winning value of τ when
β < w¯/pi, and condition (7) is not satisfied.
Proposition 8 When β < w¯/pi, pi > 1/3 and condition (7) is not satisfied, we obtain a (inte-
rior) Condorcet winner in two cases.
(a) (i) A sufficient condition for the existence of a global Condorcet winner is that df∗/dτ < 0
is monotonically decreasing in w when f∗ > 0. (ii) This condition is satisfied with logarithmic
utilities. (iii) Under (i), 0 < τGCW < 1. The decisive voter is a young, with a dependent parent,
whose income wGCW < w¯/pi is such that
F (w˘) + F (wGCW ) =
1 + pi
2pi
.
21It is easy to show, using the implicit function theorem on (1), that w˘ decreases with pi.
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(b) A local Condorcet winner 0 < τLCW < 1 exists if τLCW satisfies the following conditions:
(i) f∗(w+, τLCW ) = 0 and (ii) the child of a dependent parent who most-prefers τLCW and whose
income level, denoted by wLCW , is such that
1 + F (wLCW ) =
1 + pi
2pi
. (9)
(c) In both cases, the equilibrium allocation among the children with a dependent parent is
such that (i) those with a sufficiently low productivity level complement social transfers with
informal help, (ii) those with a productivity level high enough complement social transfers with
direct financial help, and (iii) those with intermediate productivity levels do not offer any family
help and rely exclusively on the public transfer.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof of part (a) consists in forming four exogenous (i.e., independent of the value of
τ) groups of voters in families with a dependent parent, according to their age (child or parent)
and to whether the child in the family prefers informal to direct financial help (w < β) or the
opposite (w > β). We then show that preferences satisfy the single-crossing condition (see Gans
and Smart, 1996) for these four groups. This is always the case for children of dependent parents,
and for dependent parents of low income (w < β) children. The necessary and sufficient condition
for preferences of dependent individuals with rich children (w > β) to satisfy the single-crossing
condition is that d2f∗/dτdw < 0, so that the financial help f∗ received by dependent parents
decreases faster with τ for parents of richer children. We show that this reasonable condition
is indeed satisfied with logarithmic utilities. When this condition is satisfied, the decisive voter
is a child of a dependent parent with an income level wGCW such that one half of the polity is
formed of poorer children of dependent parents (a mass piF (wGCW )) together with dependent
parents of children with income below w˘ (a mass piF (w˘)), who both prefer a larger value of τ . In
other words, this equilibrium is sustained by the opposition between sufficiently poor members
of families with a dependent parent, and the rest of the voting population (who wants a lower
value of τ).
Part (b) shows that a strictly positive value of τ may be a local Condorcet winner provided
that it totally crowds out financial help by the family. In that case, the utility of all dependent
parents is locally increasing in τ . We then add to the measure of dependent parents (pi) the
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measure of children of dependent parents whose income is low enough that they would favor a
larger value of τ (piF (wLCW )). If the sum of both groups represents one half of the voters (see
condition (9)), then τLCW > 0 is indeed a local Condorcet winner. Note that the productivity
of the decisive voter, wLCW , decreases with pi but we cannot conclude that the equilibrium tax
level τLCW will be larger, because a larger value of pi also decreases the return of the social LTC
program. Observe that, in both cases (global and local equilibrium), the Condorcet winning
value of τ is interior, even though older agents have corner solutions (τ = 0 or τ = 1).
In both cases, the equilibrium allocation is such that children of dependent parents whose
income is sufficiently different from the decisive voter’s income complement the social transfers
with informal (for low income levels) or financial (for high income levels), while intermediate
income levels (close to the decisive voter’s income) rely exclusively on social transfers.
4 Conclusion
Our model generates a pattern of family help which conforms to what is empirically observed:
low income children provide informal help to their dependent parent while richer children provide
financial help. Informal help is decreasing in the child’s income, while financial help is increasing.
We also obtain that children with income in a middle range may not provide help at all.
We then highlight several reasons why social LTC transfers may not be offered at the majority
voting equilibrium. First, if the intrinsic preference of dependent parents for informal help is
large enough, then social transfers are dominated by informal help. Second, if the probability
of becoming dependent when old is lower than one third, the children of autonomous parents
are numerous enough to oppose democratically the introduction of social LTC transfers. Third,
even when none of the first two conditions is satisfied, the majority voting equilibrium may
entail no social transfers, especially if the probability of becoming dependent when old is not
far above one third. We identify conditions for the existence of a local Condorcet winner with
no social transfers. This local majority equilibrium may be empirically relevant whenever new
programs have to be introduced at a low scale before being eventually ramped up.
Our model is a very stylized representation of reality, which could be improved in several
directions. Parents as well as children could differ in income. The social program could consist in
an insurance program rather than a transfer program. In that case, agents would vote over this
program before knowing whether their parent will become dependent. This should strengthen the
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demand for the social programs, unless a private insurance program is also available. Introducing
distortions from taxation should lower the demand for public intervention. Agents could also
differ in risk (probability of becoming dependent), for instance because of exogenous differences
in life expectancies, and in the existence of altruistic children. Note that several of these factors
have been introduced in De Donder and Pestieau (2015), but their setting does not differentiate
informal from financial family help.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4
(a) w > w¯/pi implies that FOCf > FOCτ ∀(τ, f, e) while w > β implies that FOCf > FOCe
∀(τ, f, e). If FOCf ≤ 0 for τ = f = e = 0 then FOCτ < 0 and FOCe < 0 and τ∗ = f∗ = e∗ = 0
is an equilibrium. If FOCf > 0 for τ = f = e = 0, then choosing f
∗ > 0 such that FOCf = 0
for τ = e = 0 implies that FOCτ < 0 and FOCe < 0, consistent with the most-preferred
allocation (f∗ > 0, τ∗ = e∗ = 0). Alternatively, choosing e∗ > 0 such that FOCe = 0 implies
that FOCf > 0, which is inconsistent with e
∗ > 0 being part of an equilibrium, while a similar
reasoning applies to choosing τ∗ > 0.
(b) w < w¯/pi implies that FOCτ > FOCf ∀(τ, f, e) while β < w¯/pi implies that FOCτ > FOCe
∀(τ, f, e). The rest of proof is similar to part (a).
(c) w < β implies that FOCe > FOCf ∀(τ, f, e) while β > w¯/pi implies that FOCe > FOCτ
∀(τ, f, e). The rest of proof is similar to part (a).
(d) If β > w¯/pi, then FOCe > FOCτ ∀(τ, f, e) and no child ever most-prefer τ∗ > 0. Propositions
1, 2 and 3 have jointly established that the amount of (financial or informal) family help is
minimum for the child with productivity w = β. The condition for this child to give a strictly
positive amount of help is
u′(Tβ) < αφ′(p¯).
If β < w¯/pi, then FOCτ > FOCe ∀(τ, f, e) and no child ever most-prefers e∗ > 0. In that case,
children with w < w¯/pi most-prefer τ∗ > 0 while children with w > w¯/pi most-prefer f∗ > 0.
Proposition 5(a) will show that τ∗ is decreasing in w while Proposition 3 has established that
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f∗ is increasing in w. Hence, the child who gives the lowest amount of aid has a productivity
level of w = w¯/pi, and the condition for this child to give a strictly positive amount is
u′(Tw¯/pi) < αφ′(p¯).
Proof of Proposition 5
(i) Applying the implicit function theorem on (6) together with f = e = 0, we obtain
sign
(
dτ
dw
)
= sign
(−u′ (c)− cu′′ (c)) ≤ 0
under Assumption 2(a). Part (b) is proved similarly. Part (c) is obtained applying the implicit
function theorem together with Assumption 2(b) so that
sign
(
dτ
dpi
)
= sign
(
−αw¯
pi2
φ′(x)
[
1− w¯τ/pi
x
(
−φ
′′(x)x
φ′(x)
)])
< 0
where x = p¯+ τw¯/pi.
(ii) Observe that the FOCs for τ when e = f = 0 and for e when τ = f = 0 can both be written
as
−wu′ (w(T − x)) + αyφ′ (p¯+ yx) = 0,
where (x, y) ∈ {(τ, w¯/pi), (e, β)}. Applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain that
sign
(
dx
dy
)
= sign
(
αφ′ (p¯+ yx) + αyxφ′′ (p¯+ yx)
)
> 0
by Assumption 2(b). Hence, β < w¯/pi ⇒ e∗ < τ∗ ⇒ βe∗ < τ∗w¯/pi.
Proof of Proposition 6
(a) If w < β, then f∗ = 0 and e∗ ≥ 0. Assuming e∗ > 0, the FOC for τ is given by
∂UDO
∂τ
= vd
[
w¯
pi
+ β
de∗
dτ
]
(10)
=
φ′ (p¯+ τw¯/pi + βe∗)
w2u′′ (w(T − τ − e∗)) + αβφ′′ (p¯+ τw¯/pi + βe∗)w
2u′′ (w(T − τ − e∗))
[ w¯
pi
− β
]
where we replaced for the expression for de∗/dτ in (3). We know from Proposition 2(c) that
de∗/dτ < 0 so that pushing τ above some threshold results in e∗ = 0.22 In that case, we have
that
∂UDO
∂τ
=
w¯
pi
φ′ (p¯+ τw¯/pi) > 0. (11)
22The assumption mentioned in footnote 15 implies that this threshold is lower than 1.
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When β < w¯/pi, then (10)> 0, so that UDO is increasing in τ (whether e
∗ is positive or nil) and
τ∗ = 1.
(b and c) If w > β, then f∗ ≥ 0 and e∗ = 0. Assuming f∗ > 0, the FOC for τ is given by
∂UDO
∂τ
= vd
[
w¯
pi
+
df∗
dτ
]
=
φ′ (p¯+ τw¯/pi + f∗)
u′′ (w(T − τ)− f∗) + αφ′′ (p¯+ τw¯/pi + f∗)u
′′ (w(T − τ)− f∗)
[ w¯
pi
− w
]
(12)
where we replaced for the expression for df∗/dτ in (4). We know from Proposition 3(c) that
df∗/dτ < 0 so that pushing τ above some threshold may result in f∗ = 0.23 In that case, we
have that ∂UDO /∂τ is given by (11).
(b) If w < w¯/pi, then (12)> 0, so that UDO is increasing in τ (whether f
∗ is positive or nil) and
τ∗ = 1.
(c) If w > w¯/pi, then (12)< 0, so that zero is the agent’s most-preferred value of τ among the
values of τ low enough that f∗(τ, w) > 0. Alternatively, one is the agent’s most-preferred value
of τ among the values of τ large enough that f∗(τ, w) = 0. Comparing the elderly’s utility level
with τ = 0 (given by v(p¯+ f∗(0, w))) and with τ = 1 (given by v(p¯+ w¯/pi)), we obtain that the
elderly prefers τ = 0 if
f∗(0, w) >
w¯
pi
.
Since we know from Proposition 3(b) that f∗(0, w) is increasing in w, we define w˘ in the following
way: (i) If f∗(0, w+) > w¯/pi then w˘ is such that f∗(0, w˘) = w¯/pi,24 (ii) If f∗(0, w+) < w¯/pi then
w˘ = w+.
Proof of Proposition 8
(a) We have already established that preferences of dependent parents with w > w¯/pi are not
single-peaked (see proposition 6 (c)), so that we cannot apply the usual median voter theorem.
De Donder (2013) shows that, if voters can be grouped into exogenous categories (i.e., here,
categories not depending on τ), and if the single-crossing property a` la Gans and Smart (1996)
is satisfied inside each group of voters, then a global Condorcet winning value of τ exists. We
then form four exogenous groups of voters, according to their age (child or parent) and to
23The assumption mentioned in footnote 15 implies that f∗(τ, w) = 0 for τ > τ˜ with τ˜ < 1.
24It is immediate that f∗(0, w¯/pi) < w¯/pi.
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whether the child in the family prefers informal to direct financial help (w < β) or the opposite
(w > β).
(i) We first show that preferences of young agents with dependent parents are indeed single-
crossing. Their indirect utility function as a function of τ is
V DY = u(w(T − τ − e∗ − f∗)) + αφ(p¯+ b+ βe∗ + f∗)
where e∗ = e∗(τ, w) and f∗ = f∗(τ, w). Using the envelope theorem, the marginal rate of
substitution between b and τ is
MRS = −∂V
D
Y /∂τ
∂V DY /∂b
=
wu′(c)
αφ′(x)
where c = w(T −τ −e∗) and x = b+ p¯+βe∗ for w < β, and c = w(T −τ)−f∗ and x = b+ p¯+f∗
when w > β.
If w < β, then f∗ = 0 and e∗ ≥ 0. If e∗ > 0, then using the FOC for e (equation (2)),
we obtain that MRS = β. If e∗ = 0, we make use of the fact that the same FOC for e∗ is
negative for e = 0 to obtain that the MRS is larger than β and is weakly increasing in w given
Assumption 2. Observe that the government budget constraint b(τ) is linear in τ with a slope
w¯/pi. Tangency between indifference curve and budget constraint then occurs on the strictly
concave part of the indifference curve, where e∗ = 0 for the individual (see Proposition 4(b)).
Preferences are single-crossing over these parts (see Epple and Romano (1996, Figure 4)).
If w > β, then e∗ = 0 and f∗ ≥ 0. If f∗ > 0, then using the FOC for f (equation (1)),
we obtain that MRS = w. If f∗ = 0, we make use of the fact that the same FOC for f∗ is
negative for f = 0 to obtain that the MRS is larger than w and is weakly increasing in w given
Assumption 2. The strictly concave parts of the indifference curves are then single-crossing
(agents with w > w¯/pi most prefer τ∗ = 0).
We now study the preferences of dependent individuals. The indirect utility function of
a dependent elderly whose child has w < β is V DO = φ(p¯ + b + βe
∗), which is monotonically
increasing in τ for all values of w < β (see the proof Proposition 6(a)). The single-crossing
condition (see Gans and Smart, 1996, section 2.1) is then trivially satisfied, since all agents with
w < β prefer any larger to any smaller value of τ (graphically, indifference curves all cut the
budget constraint from above in the (τ, b) space, since β | de∗/dτ |< w¯/pi as shown in the proof
of Proposition 6(a)).
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The indirect utility function of a dependent elderly whose child has w > β is V DO = φ(p¯ +
b + f∗) so that the MRS between τ and b is equal to MRS = −df∗/dτ and dMRS/dw =
−d2f∗/dτdw.
So, if d2f∗/dτdw < 0, the preferences of the four exogenous sets of voters are single-crossing
and, by De Donder (2013), the global Condorcet winner exists and corresponds to the median
most-preferred value of τ .
(ii) We show that logarithmic preferences satisfy the single crossing property for dependent
parents with w > β. Observe that
d2f∗
dτdw
=
−1
[u′′(c) + αφ′′(x)]2
[
u′′(c)2 + αφ′′(x)u′′(c) + α(w − w¯
pi
)(
dc
dw
φ′′(x)u′′′(c)− dx
dw
φ′′′(x)u′′(c))
]
which is obtained from (4) after tedious computations. In the case of a logarithmic utility, the
expression inside brackets becomes
1
c4
+
α
c2x2
+ (w − w¯
pi
)α
[ −2
x2c3
dc
dw
+
2
x3c2
dx
dw
]
. (13)
Fully differentiating (1) with respect to w, we obtain
dc
dw
=
αc2
x2
dx
dw
.
Replacing this expression into (13), we obtain
1
c4
+
α
c2x2
+ (w − w¯
pi
)α
dx
dw
2
x3c
[
1
c
− α
x
]
with [1c − αx ] = 0 from the FOC with respect to f , (1).
Hence
d2f∗
dτdw
=
−1
[u′′(c) + αφ′′(x)]2
[
1
c4
+
α
c2x2
]
< 0.
(iii) Since condition (7) is not satisfied, we have that
pi (F (w¯/pi) + F (w˘)) >
1 + pi
2
,
where the LHS represents the maesure of children with a dependent parent and of old dependents
who most prefer a strictly positive value of τ . At the same time, we have that
piF (w˘) <
1 + pi
2
,
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since F (w˘) < 1 and pi ≤ (1 + pi)/2 ∀pi ≤ 1. Thus, old dependents who prefer the maximum tax
rate cannot form a majority by themselves. The decisive voter is therefore a young agent with
a dependent parent and with a productivity level, denoted by wGCW , such that wGCW < w¯/pi.
Voters who want a larger value of τ are young agents with dependent parents and w < wGCW
together with old dependent agents with w < w˘ (the other groups of agents want a lower value
of τ) and must represent one half of the voters. This is how we implicitly define wGCW :
pi
(
F (w˘) + F (wGCW )
)
=
1 + pi
2
.
(b) Condition f∗(τLCW , w+) = 0 implies that f∗(τLCW , w) = 0 for every child of a dependent
parent with w¯/pi < w < w+, since f
∗(τ, w) is increasing in w, ∀τ . Then, every dependent parent
with w > w¯/pi has locally increasing utilities around τLCW as db/dτ > 0 (see equation (11)).
We already know that the utility of all dependent agents with w < w¯/pi monotonically increases
with τ (see the proof of Proposition 6(a) and (b)). The dependent parents form a mass of
measure pi. As for children with dependent parents, we know from Proposition 5 (a) that their
most-preferred value of τ is decreasing with w, so that all of them with w < wLCW prefer a
larger-than-τLCW value of τ . The mass pi
(
1 + F (wLCW )
)
then represents the mass of voters
who prefer a slightly larger value of τ than τLCW , so that τLCW is a local Condorcet winner if
this mass represents exactly one half of voters.
(c) Result obtained after long and tedious but straightforward manipulations of the FOCs
for financial and informal family help (equations (1) and (2)), available from the authors.
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